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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
EDGAR JOSE MONTERO, : Case No. 20060859-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
The Defendant/Appellant Edgar Montero maintains that Detective Adamson 
coerced a confession from him. (See Br. of Appellant, March 8, 2007). The totality of 
the circumstances reflects that Adamson interrogated Montero over a six-plus-hour 
period using misrepresentations, persistence, periods of incommunicado, threats and 
promises, absence of family, and the false-friend technique. In the end, Montero con-
fessed to stop the interrogation. (See R. 488:297-99). The coerced confession was 
unlawful. See State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, | 1 1 , 984 P.2d 1009 (recognizing that 
"certain interrogation techniques'1 may be "so offensive to a civilized system of justice 
that they must be condemned"). It should have been suppressed. The trial court erred 
when it allowed the confession to be used in evidence. 
The state disagrees. (Br. of Appellee, May 7, 2007). In its analysis, the state 
isolates various events during the interrogation and suggests that the individual events fail 
to support that Montero's will was overborne. That analysis disregards the law, where the 
interrogation must be assessed under the totality of the circumstances. Here, Adamson 
engaged in several manipulative tactics that were designed to induce Montero to confess 
when he otherwise would not have done so. 
Pursuant to Rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this reply brief 
addresses the state's divide-and-conquer analysis for the coerced confession. For the 
reasons stated herein, and as more fully set forth in the Brief of Appellant, Montero 
maintains the trial court's ruling should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
THE CONFESSION WAS COERCED AND SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED. 
A. THE STATE ISOLATES INDIVIDUAL EVENTS IN THE 
INTERROGATION TO CLAIM THAT THE CONFESSION WAS NOT 
COERCED. YET THE ANALYSIS MUST CONSIDER THE TOTALITY OF 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The State's Divide-and-Conquer Approach. Montero maintains his confession 
was coerced. (Br. of Appellant, Argument A.) His argument considers the interrogation 
as a whole, and the numerous techniques used by the detective throughout the interroga-
tion to extract a confession. (Id.) In response, the state relies on a divide-and-conquer 
analysis. It evaluates individual events in isolation to determine whether each separate 
event established coercion. (See Br. of Appellee, 26-45; see specifically id. at 29 
(claiming statements challenged as "unduly threatening" and made "approximately five 
hours" before the confession "cannot reasonably be said to have compelled defendant's 
confession"); 29-30 (claiming that a statement challenged as improperly threatening and 
occurring "in the second segment of the interview" following a break "is not coercive"); 
30 (claiming "[t]he same is true" of the "allegedly improper threat" in the "final segment 
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of the interview"); 32-33 (stating that while the detective deferred defendant's request to 
call his mother, that does not indicate that "defendant's will was overborne"); 34 
(claiming the length of the interrogation "is a Tar cry from'" a violation); 37-38 (stating 
that when an officer recasts the facts as less serious to induce a confession, that technique 
'"standing alone'" does not "overcome a suspect's will") (cite omitted); 39-42 (stating 
police misrepresentations are '"insufficient... to make [an] otherwise voluntary confes-
sion inadmissible"'; police may use "small deceptions"; and "a 'defendant's will is not 
overborne simply because he is led to believe that the government's knowledge of his 
guilt is greater than it actually is'") (cites omitted; brackets in original; emphasis added); 
44-45 (claiming no "arguable misrepresentation" here "sufficed to overbear [defendant's] 
will"); 46 (claiming the "false-friend technique" is "not inherently coercive")). 
The state's method of considering each event in isolation or "standing alone" 
(quoting Br. of Appellee, 38) - and then disavowing it as coercion - undermines the 
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. See Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, lfl[19, 20-45 
(considering the totality of the circumstances). 
Indeed, while it is true that an isolated technique may support coercion, see, e.g., 
id, at f If 11, 20 (stating certain techniques in isolation or as applied to the characteristics 
of the accused are offensive and must be condemned), the same may not be said for the 
voluntariness showing. That is, for voluntariness, a court "must examine the 'totality of 
the circumstances'" or the whole picture to determine whether a confession was made 
"freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort." Id at ^14 (cite 
omitted). 
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And while a "defendant's will" may not be overborne "simply because" (quoting 
Br. of Appellee, 42 (emphasis added)) of an isolated incident - where, for example, an 
officer tells a half-truth - the facts and circumstances as a whole may compel a different 
result. The synergy of the collective tactics may elevate the interrogation to the level of a 
coerced confession. See, e.g., Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ^ }45 (fully considering several 
events, including misrepresentations, false-friend technique, threats and promises, and 
other factors to find coercion). Here Montero has not claimed that his will was overborne 
simply because of an isolated event. (See Br. of Appellant, Argument A.) He has relied 
on the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. 
As set forth in the Brief of Appellant (Argument A.), the overall circumstances 
demonstrate that Detective Adamson used threats and promises throughout the 
interrogation interspersed with other techniques including relentless pressure and 
cajoling, the false-friend technique, and attempts to induce a confession to the shooting 
with justification or mitigating circumstances. (Br. of Appellant, 15-34 (reflecting total 
circumstances of the interrogation); id. at 35-46 (pointing to techniques used throughout 
the interrogation)). In addition, the circumstances support that Adamson used 
misrepresentations, deceptions, and misleading information throughout. (See id. at 35-
46). The circumstances support coercion. The state's divide-and-conquer or piecemeal 
approach should be prohibited. 
The State9s Claims Regarding Specific Techniques. Next, with respect to 
Adamson's techniques, the state acknowledges that Detective Adamson "may have 
overstated" some of the evidence against Montero (quoting Br. of Appellee, 43). Indeed, 
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the state does not dispute the falseness of Adamson's repeated claims to Montero that 
"friends" identified him as the shooter. (See Br. of Appellee, 40 (reiterating Montero's 
argument that Adamson made misrepresentations about "friends" implicating him; and 
reiterating that Lonia Kersey did not place Montero in the red SUV, Jose Johnson refused 
to cooperate, Marci Batchelor had not been interviewed at the time of Montero!s interro-
gation, and Eugene Spight had not specifically identified Montero)). However, the state 
seems to brush off the falsehoods as insignificant to the analysis. (See, e.g., id. at 40-41). 
Yet when officers allow a suspect to believe that friends have implicated him in 
crime, such duplicity may lead the suspect "to see [himself] as either being set up or 
railroaded." Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, f 22 (citing Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, 
The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 Denv. U.L. 
Rev. 979, 1044 (1997)). "Such a suspect may well determine that 'continued resistance 
is futile (because the police have evidence that will convict him despite his innocence).'" 
Id. (citing Welsh S. White, What is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 Rutgers L.Rev. 
2001, 2053 (1998)). "Such a suspect may also conclude that, given the futility of 
resistance, it is most prudent to cooperate and even confess falsely in order to get 
leniency." Id. Duplicity is relevant to the analysis. 
The state further discounts additional misrepresentations made by Adamson in the 
interrogation. According to the state, the "trial transcript shows that police talked to 
many witnesses at the scene of the shooting [who] had tied defendant to the murder." 
(Br. of Appellee, 40 (citing "R487:144, 158, 180-81; R488:244"); but see R. 487:144 
(reflecting that officers had a general description of a white male, "5 feet to 6 feet tall," 
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wearing jeans, a white T-shirt and a black jacket); 487:158 (reflecting that witnesses were 
not at the party); 487:180-81 (reflecting descriptions and specifying Jose Johnson); 488: 
244 (putting Sword and Jose Johnson at the scene)). Yet witnesses, who were questioned 
before Adamson's interrogation with Montero, did not identify Montero as the shooter 
even when they were shown a picture of him in a photo lineup. (See R. 487:152-55,162; 
488:311). Thus, Adamson's interrogation statements suggesting otherwise were false. 
Also, although Eugene Spight identified Montero as the shooter at trial, he did not 
identify Montero to police shortly after the shooting and before Adamson interrogated 
Montero. (R. 488:304-07 (reflecting that Eugene talked to officers when he was drunk, 
upset, crying and spent - or "shot" - and he identified two suspects); 488:308, 311 (indi-
cating that Eugene identified a white boy named Pierre Brandon)). In fact, since Eugene 
had not specifically identified Montero, Adamson told Montero to "hang out for a couple 
of hours" during the interrogation so that he could show pictures to Eugene. (R. 135). In 
addition, contrary to the state's assertion, the evidence suggests that when Eugene Spight 
talked to police after the shooting, he believed the shooter was a front-seat passenger in a 
Jeep. (R. 488:307, 308, 311 (indicating that Eugene told officers the suspect got into the 
front passenger seat of a Jeep)). 
The state likewise downplays Adamson's assertions during the interrogation con-
cerning gun shot residue (GSR) testing, fingerprints, and DNA evidence. (See Br. of 
Appellee, 44 (citing "R122, 183-84")). According to the state, Adamson did not claim to 
already have results from those tests implicating Montero; "but rather," he asserted that 
investigators "merely planned to conduct those tests additional tests [sic]." (Id.) 
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Yet during the interrogation, Adamson used the threat of the tests to expose 
Montero as the shooter if he did not confess. Adamson claimed officers would collect or 
already had collected compelling physical evidence that Montero would not be able to 
explain away. (R. 121-23 (stating that officers had performed the GSR test on Montero, 
and demanding that Montero explain what they would find from the test); 183 (indicating 
during the interrogation that DNA evidence in the coat would reveal the shooter); 184 
(stating during the interrogation that if Montero were innocent, "we won't find 
fingerprints" on the gun; also "if [they're] on [there] ... then that's a bad deal right")). 
According to case law, officers generally make such misleading statements to an 
accused during an interrogation to make him believe the physical evidence will convict 
him, so he may as well confess. See, e.g., Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, f23. According to 
the Utah Supreme Court, a suspect may be "more likely to confess when faced with 
assertions, as here, that the State has evidence of fingerprints, palm prints, ballistic 
evidence and the like, implicating him because '[b]oth the guilty and the innocent have a 
harder time explaining away evidence that is allegedly derived from scientific 
technologies.'" Id (citing Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, at 1023). 
The record here supports that Adamson wanted a confession. Also, Jose Johnson 
(aka "Savvy D" or "Savage") was a primary focus (seeR. 487:166, 179-81; 488:244-45), 
but refused to cooperate (R. 487:156, 193; 488:245-48). Consequently, Adamson worked 
Montero. Adamson's misrepresentations and threats, along with other coercive tactics, 
had an effect on Montero. (See Br. of Appellant, 15-46 (pointing to techniques used 
throughout the interrogation)). Montero confessed to end the interrogation. (See, e.g., R. 
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488:297-99). In this case, each technique added to the total coercive circumstances. 
Finally, with respect to the fact that Montero was handcuffed to a chair in the 
interrogation room for more than six hours, the state maintains that does not contribute to 
coercion. (See Br. of Appellee, 36). In connection with that claim, the state cites to U.S. 
v. Cardenas, 410 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2005); State v. Whitaker, 135 P.3d 923 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2006); and State v. Agnello, 674 N.W.2d 594, 600 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). Those 
cases are distinguishable. 
In Cardenas, agents arrested defendant in connection with an alien smuggling 
conspiracy. During an initial interrogation on the evening of May 15, they provided 
defendant with her rights per Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in Spanish and 
English. Cardenas, 410 F.3d at 290. Defendant waived her rights and answered 
questions. See id. at 290; see also id at 291, 292, 295. 
The next morning, agents discussed the May 15 interrogation among themselves 
and determined it was not entirely accurate. Id. at 290-91. They asked defendant 
"whether she wished to speak to [Attorney] Martinez, and urged her to cooperate, telling 
her they believed her previous statement was untruthful. [Defendant] then indicated she 
wished to speak to Martinez. Handcuffed, she was brought from the detention area to a 
conference room in the U.S. Attorney's office." Id at 291. Agents again administered 
Miranda warnings and defendant again waived. Id. 
Prior to trial, defendant maintained that the waiver for May 16 was coerced in part 
because she was handcuffed. See id, at 291-92. The trial court agreed. See id. at 292. 
The government appealed, and the appellate court reversed. It stated that "[w]e have 
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never held that a new recitation of rights is required with every break in interrogation." 
Id. at 294. Thus, the warnings and waiver on May 16 likely were unnecessary. Also, the 
court ruled that the total circumstances surrounding the waiver, including the fact that the 
defendant was handcuffed, would not support coercion. Id at 295; see also Whitaker, 
135 P.3d at 930-31 (rejecting defendant's claim that he was coerced into waiving his 
Miranda rights based on the fact that he was a "young man" in a Los Angeles sheriffs 
bureau being interrogated by FBI veterans, and he was "handcuffed"). 
Montero's argument does not hinge on the handcuffs during that point in time 
when Adamson provided Miranda warnings; rather, his argument concerns the coercive 
nature of the total circumstances in the interrogation. (See Br. of Appellant, Argument). 
Thus, Cardenas and Whitaker, are inapplicable. 
In addition, while the court in Agnello, 674 N.W.2d at 600, stated that case law 
may not support that "handcuffing in itself is coercive, it also recognized that "Agnello 
was not handcuffed during the interrogation sessions." Id He was handcuffed "only 
during breaks when the officers left the room." Id That case is distinguishable since 
Montero was handcuffed to a chair during the entirety of the six-plus-hour detention for 
interrogation. (See R. 487:207; 488:299; 524 (videos)); see also State v. Knight, 518 
So.2d 799, 800 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (considering that the "essentially illiterate" 
defendant was handcuffed to a chair for almost six hours). That fact contributes to the 
overall coercive nature of the environment. 
In deciding coercion, a court will consider whether the confession was the product 
of improper or coercive pressures or techniques used by the police. It will consider 
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whether the defendant was the "victim of a conspicuously unequal confrontation in which 
the pressures brought to bear on [him] ... exceeded the defendant's ability to resist." State 
v. Clappes, 401 N.W.2d 759, 765 (1987). Police conduct does not need to be egregious 
in order to be coercive; subtle pressures are coercive where they exceed a defendant's 
ability to resist. See State v. Hoppe, 661 N.W.2d 407, 416 (Wis. 2003). This Court will 
decide the matter based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation 
and confession. 
The detective's persistence in connection with numerous other tactics used 
throughout the interrogation support that Montero confessed to end the matter. (Br. of 
Appellant, 15-34 (reflecting total circumstances of the interrogation); id at 35-46 
(pointing to techniques used throughout the interrogation)). As further described in the 
Brief of Appellant, Adamson used manipulation designed to induce the accused to 
confess where the accused otherwise would not have confessed. (Br. of Appellant, 
Argument). The total facts and circumstances support coercion. 
B. MONTERO WAS PREJUDICED. 
With respect to prejudice, the state relies on a form of the sufficiency analysis and 
identifies evidence it considers relevant to the jury's verdict. (See Br. of Appellee, 46 
(identifying evidence to support a verdict)). That analysis is inapplicable here. See State 
v. Mitchell 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989) (in assessing prejudice, the court will not 
apply the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard; "rather, it focuses on the taint caused by 
the error"). 
In addition, the state assumes the jury was unaffected by the confession and the 
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jury found Marci Batchelor and Eugene Spight to be credible and compelling. (See Br. 
of Appellee, 46 (citing to evidence from Marci Batchelor and Eugene Spight, and 
evidence of flight to support a lack of prejudice)). The state's analysis disregards that 
evidence of a confession has a profound influence on the jury. See Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991). Confession evidence can lead the jury to make 
credibility findings where it otherwise would not. See, e.g., id. at 298. 
[A] full confession in which the defendant discloses the motive for and means of 
the crime may tempt the jury to rely upon that evidence alone in reaching its 
decision. In the case of a coerced confession such as that given by [defendant] 
Fulminante to [the government informant], the risk that the confession is 
unreliable, coupled with the profound impact that the confession has upon the jury, 
requires a reviewing court to exercise extreme caution before determining that the 
admission of the confession at trial was harmless. 
Id at 296. 
Also, in this case the state disregards that Marci expressed "doubt" about her 
reported observations. (See R. 487:96-97). Likewise, evidence supports that Eugene's 
perceptions were inexact, fallible and influenced by his emotional and inebriated state. 
(See R. 488:304-05, 307, 308, 311); see also State v. Howland, 761 P.2d 579, 580 n. 1 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (recognizing the law, where there may be reasons for flight that are 
consistent with innocence, and evidence of flight does not necessarily reflect guilt); State 
v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 575-76 (Utah 1983) (stating that "the idea that flight constitutes 
an 'implied admission' of guilt is not supported by any federal or state decision"). Thus, 
the evidence - absent the coerced confession - raised doubt about guilt. (See R. 487:96-
97 (Marci testified to doubt); 488:304-05, 307, 308, 311 (evidence supported that Eugene 
was drunk, shocked, and confused; also he identified a person named Pierre Brandon and 
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indicated the shooter got in the front passenger seat of a Jeep)). 
In addition, the evidence pointed to Johnson as the shooter. (Br. of Appellant, 49). 
Based on the record here, it is likely that the confession had a persuasive influence 
on the trial and the jury. See, e.g., Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296. That constitutes 
prejudice. 
The state has failed in its burden of proof in demonstrating a lack of prejudice. 
See id. at 295-96 (specifying the state must meet its burden in "demonstrating that the 
admission of the confession" did not contribute to the defendant's conviction); State v. 
Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1986) (articulating "harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard); State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 359, 377 (Utah 1993) (stating "the side 
which benefited by the error (the prosecution) must show beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the error did not contribute to the verdict (or sentence) obtained"). The inadmissible evi-
dence harmed Montero, compelling the determination that this case should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth in the Brief of Appellant and above, Montero respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the trial court ruling on the motion to exclude the interrogation 
statements and remand the case for further proceedings. 
SUBMITTED this 1) ^ day of J ^ W , 2007. 
Linda M. Jones 
Kimberly Clark 
Ralph Dellapiana 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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